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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Abstract: Sunset laws are laws designed to limit the size of state government by 
providing a process whereby statutorily created programs, agencies and bureaus 
are reviewed cyclically and their effectiveness assessed.  Possible sunset results 
include continuation of the status quo, a reorganization or consolidation with 
other state agencies or agency termination.  These programs exist in 30 states and 
use four distinct approaches, reflecting the confusion associated with the 
purpose and effects of such programs.  This paper utilizes state expenditure and 
employment data to isolate the effects of sunset laws in general and the effects of 
each of the four different versions of these laws.  I find that states that utilize 
sunset programs reduce spending at the state level, while increasing the level of 
government services provided.  This increase in the efficiency of providing 
government services appears to be from the oversight of bureaucrats by the 
legislature, rather than from closures of obsolete agencies, and is therefore most 
strongly associated with comprehensive sunset programs, which conduct a 
greater volume of reviews.  
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THE EXPENDITURE EFFECTS OF SUNSET LAWS IN STATE GOVERNMENTS 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
There are many different mechanisms that have been devised over the last 40 
years with the expressed purpose of limiting or controlling government 
spending at the state level.  Examples of such legislative restraints include 
balanced budget rules, tax and expenditure limits, Governor term limits and line-
item veto power, and the effectiveness of these laws has been widely studied1.  
Starting in 1976, in Colorado, a new mechanism appeared on the landscape; 
sunset laws.  The paper attempts to determine the effectiveness of these laws in 
their stated purpose of controlling government spending. 
Sunset laws first appeared on the political scene as the result of lobbying by 
the Colorado chapter of Common Cause, a citizen’s advocacy group.  The stated 
goal of these laws has been to promote “good government” by placing an 
expiration date on government agencies, boards, committees and commissions.  
As this expiration date nears, these governmental entities are subject to a review 
in which the bureaucrats at each entity are responsible for justifying their 
existence to the legislature in order to continue their existence.  At the conclusion 
                                                 
1 Abrams and Dougan (1986), Crain and Miller (1990), Endersby and Towle (1997), Besley and 
Case (2003) 
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of this review process the sunset boards, populated by state legislators, make 
recommendations on the future of the reviewed entity.  Suggestions can range 
from a continuation of the status quo to some form of reorganization or 
consolidation to elimination of the program, agency or board in question.  Sunset 
laws are unique in that their default position, in the absence of a sunset review, is 
the discontinuation of the entity.   
Colorado was the first state to adopt sunset laws, but the idea was a 
politically popular one, spreading quickly to as many as 36 states by 1981.  By 
1981, the effectiveness of these laws at actually delivering the savings promised 
began to be called into question.  In some states, few agencies were being retired 
and many questioned where the resources spent in conducting these reviews 
were worth the cost, given the lack of tangible results.  As a result of this debate, 
the spread of sunset programs abated, and in that same year, North Carolina 
became the first state to “sunset” its sunset law, starting a trend that would see a 
dozen states drop their sunset laws by the beginning of the 1990s.  From 1990 to 
today, the total number of states using Sunset laws has remained fairly constant, 
with a small increase in the past few years. 
Today, the states that use sunset laws take four distinct approaches: 
comprehensive, regulatory, selective and discretionary review.  Comprehensive 
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review sunset states require all statutory agencies to be subject to a sunset review 
within a designated cycle.  The length of the sunset cycle varies from state to 
state.  Delaware and Ohio have the shortest cycle (4 years), while Texas has the 
longest (12 years).  Regulatory review only sunset states focus exclusively on 
regulatory and licensing agencies and bureaus. States with selective or 
discretionary review sunset provisions seek to reduce the time and expense 
associated with sunset reviews by concentrating only on agencies selected 
through legislative or committee recommendations. Figure 1 provides a more 
complete look at the use of sunset provisions across the U.S. states over the past 
30 years and Table 1 provides a comparison of the states were that using sunset 
in 1981 versus 2005. 
Today, 30 states have sunset laws, but the debate surrounding their 
effectiveness remains.  In this paper, I investigate the question of whether sunset 
laws affect government spending and the cost of providing government services.  
Using evidence from state government expenditures and employment data, I 
find that states that utilize comprehensive, regulatory or selective sunset 
programs generate lower levels of expenditures at the state level.  At the same 
time, those states also offer a greater level of services – measured in terms of the 
number of full-time equivalent employees on the state payroll.  The combination 
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of lower expenditures and higher levels of services provided suggests that the 
cost of providing government services in these states has decrease.  The evidence 
suggests that these gains appear to be more closely related to the oversight of 
bureaucrats provided by the sunset process rather than from a larger volume of 
agency closures. 
 
SUNSET LAWS: 
The origin of the idea for sunset laws can be traced back to Thomas Jefferson, 
who said that “every law naturally expires every 19 years2” (which was 
considered to be a generation at that time), and to John Adams, whose Sedition 
Act of 1798 was written so that it expired once he left office. 
Sunset laws at the state level were initially designed to apply to professional 
and occupational licensing organizations, advisory boards and commissions.  As 
sunset laws grew in popularity, they quickly evolved, with the first change being 
that states began to apply the sunset concept to all statutory agencies.  By the end 
of 1978, seven states adopted “comprehensive” sunset laws,3 which require that 
all entities created by the legislature be subject to a sunset review once per 
review cycle. 
                                                 
2 Mooney, pg. 2 
3 See Table 2 for more details about the specifics behind the original Sunset program 
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A typical sunset hearing requires the bureaucratic agency to invest a 
significant amount of time and resources into documenting the accomplishments 
of the agency since the last such review.  Estimates of the time dedicated to 
preparing for these review range from a few hundred hours to several thousand 
hours for larger agencies4.  The actual review process also consumes the time of 
the legislators on the review board, and is open to the public, allowing interested 
parties to become involved in the process.  This likely subjects the process to 
additional lobbying from interested groups.  Early criticism of sunset laws is 
divided between the potential wastefulness of having so much time dedicated to 
the process and the increased lobbying activity of special interest groups. 
The sunset concept also can apply to specific pieces of legislation.  For 
example, a ban on handguns can be written with an expiration date in it, in order 
to force a review of the statute after a given amount of time.  Several states5 allow 
such provisions for individual laws, despite not having an official sunset statute 
in place, and these clauses are not uncommon at the federal level as well.  For the 
purposes of this study, these states are not considered to be sunset states. 
                                                 
4 Lyons and Freeman, pg. 153 
5 California, Idaho, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Nevada, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Virginia 
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Other legislative oversight vehicles are available to state governments which 
were designed to promote efficiency.  These include tax and expenditure limits, 
line item veto, term limits, balanced budget amendments and more.  Much 
research has been done regarding the effectiveness of such measures and most 
studies agree that such institutions do matter.  Poterba (1997) and Besley and 
Case (2003) offer extensive reviews of this literature.  Sunset laws are unique in 
that they have a “forcing mechanism,” in the form of the termination dates, 
which compels the legislative body to act.  If the legislative body shirks its duties 
under any of the traditional expenditure control mechanisms, the status quo is 
retained, and no oversight has taken place.  Under sunset, if a review is not 
conducted, the default position is that the agency, laws or program in question 
expires.  In other words, the status quo is altered, giving the affected party a 
strong incentive to ensure the review does take place. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW: 
There is an extensive literature on the effects of legislative and congressional 
restraints and their effects on the level of spending in state government.  But to 
date, none of this literature has included sunset laws in its analysis.  What does 
exist regarding sunset laws typically was written during the early days of sunset 
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and by and large does not address the topic empirically, choosing instead to offer 
insights from anecdotes and survey responses.  I will briefly review this coverage 
and then move into the literature on legislative and congressional restraints. 
Adams and Sherman (1978) provide a positive assessment of the possibilities 
for sunset to provide more efficient government.  However, the authors worked 
for Common Cause, the citizen’s activist group influential in getting the first 
sunset laws introduced, so their enthusiasm is understandable.  The purpose of 
the paper was clearly to spread the word about sunset laws and the ten “Sunset 
Principles,” first laid out by Common Cause as enumerated in Table 2.  Within 
these initial guidelines is an acknowledgement that sunset would need to evolve 
from its origins in order to be an effective tool and this has proven to be true.  
Overall, the focus of the paper is on promoting the sunset agenda, and its timing 
allowed for no data to be considered in its analysis. 
Hamm and Robertson (1981) look at factors that affect the adoption of new 
legislative oversight methods like sunset and rule and regulation review.  They 
find that factors like high legislative turnover and split control of the legislative 
and executive branches lead to greater adoption of both of these means of 
legislative oversight.  Hamm and Robertson do not address the costs and benefits 
of the adoption of such measures, simply the likelihood that they are adopted.   
 8
Lyons and Freeman (1984) and Curry (1990) offer case studies of the sunset 
process within a specific state.  Lyons and Freeman look at Tennessee, which 
uses a comprehensive sunset statute, and therefore reviews all statutory agencies 
in a 6-year cycle.  Their empirical findings are limited to the response from a 
questionnaire sent to Tennessee legislators, but these results suggest that agency 
officials are “more conscious of legislative authority.”6 The sunset process is not 
seen by bureaucrats or legislators as an antagonistic one, but rather as increasing 
opportunities for bureaucrats and legislators to work together.  Curry 
investigates sunset in Texas, which had a comprehensive sunset law7 with a 12-
year review cycle at the time of Curry’s study (although it has since been 
modified to a selective statute).  Curry offers no empirical support for his 
arguments, but through anecdotal evidence he offers a mildly positive 
assessment of sunset (despite his concerns about the impact of increased 
lobbying that accompanies the sunset program). 
The most extensive survey available regarding sunset is by Kearney (1990), 
who looks at the sunset experience throughout the United States. Kearney finds 
that after a period of rapid adoption of sunset laws, the tide of public opinion 
apparently turned against sunset.  This conclusion is drawn from the fact that no 
                                                 
6 Lyons and Freeman, pg. 156 
7 With a few exceptions, like state colleges 
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additional states added sunset laws from the early 1980s to the time at which his 
paper was published, while several states retired their sunset entirely or 
modified their initial statutes during that period.  Based on this trend, Kearney’s 
conclusion is that sunset is an ineffective mechanism for limiting the size of state 
government.  To this he adds anecdotal evidence of some of the odd results 
associated with sunset8, but does not offer any empirical assessments of the costs 
and benefits of the sunset programs.    
Other individuals have looked at sunset clauses on individual laws.  An 
example of this is Mooney (2004) who discusses the use of sunset clauses by the 
Bush administration to ease the passage of controversial or tightly contested 
legislation.  Recent examples of laws that got passed with sunset provisions 
include the Patriot Act (aspects set to expire in 2005 were renewed) and the Bush 
tax cuts (set to expire in 2010 and 2013).  But experience indicates that these laws 
are unlikely to come off the books.  In each of these examples, the sunset 
provisions were included to aid the passage of the initial law.  For example, the 
Bush tax cut in 2003 would have been subject to a supermajority requirement of 
                                                 
8 For example, as of Kearney’s survey in 1990, Florida had terminated 90 agencies through 
Sunset, but created 104 new ones.   
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60 votes under the Byrd rule.9  Senator Charles Grassley, a supporter of the 
proposed cuts, astutely attached a sunset provision that potentially would 
discontinue these tax cuts one day shy of 10 years.  This removed the 
supermajority requirement of the Byrd rule and consequently the tax cuts passed 
58-33.  Within days of this passage, Republicans in the Senate introduced 
legislation to make these tax cuts permanent, as they had done in the early days 
of the Patriot Act.  So the sunset provisions that assisted in the passage of these 
laws faced immediate challenges.10  Mooney uses this to conclude that the 
presence of a sunset clause may increase the likelihood that a law is passed. 
The literature on constitutional and legislative restraints attempts to assess 
the effect of barriers to spending (like tax and expenditure limits or balanced 
budget amendments) and alterations to the balance of power in state government 
(like the line item veto power or gubernatorial term limits) on state spending.  
Poterba (1997) attempts to consolidate all the evidence on balanced budget laws, 
both from the federal and state levels, and offers an extensive review of the 
literature regarding the effectiveness of these laws.  While not every paper he 
examines comes to the same conclusion, Poterba concludes that these rules do 
                                                 
9 Bills that affect government revenues beyond a 10 year timeframe are subject to a supermajority 
requirement in order to pass 
10 Mooney, pg 70 
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make a difference on the level and growth rates of spending in the states that use 
them, though not every program necessarily decreases spending. 
One of the papers that Poterba cites which does not agree with Poterba’s 
conclusion that these institutions matter is Abrams and Dougan (1986).  They 
look at the effects of constitutional restraints like balanced budget rules, limits on 
spending and taxation, line-item veto and gubernatorial term limitations on 
spending at both the state and local levels.  Following Becker (1983), Abrams and 
Dougan model a market where the equilibrium level of taxes and spending is 
established by competition from various pressure groups.  In this equilibrium, 
the value of providing benefits to these groups comes in the form of support for 
the candidate who provides the service (or opposition to his opponent).  The 
costs are in the need for increased spending, and therefore taxes, which will 
increase the incentive for opposition from those opposed to higher taxes. 
If the various constitutional restraints on spending or taxation do nothing to 
affect the marginal benefits from providing government services or the marginal 
costs of raising the revenue required, they are attempting to enforce outcomes in 
this market that are deviations from the equilibrium outcome.  With the market 
out of equilibrium, one should expect to find that individual actors will follow 
their individual incentives, leading the market back to the equilibrium levels of 
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taxes and spending.  In other words, such restraints, if they do not alter the costs 
and benefits faced by the politicians in the market, should not lead a different 
outcome, like lower levels of spending and taxation. 
Abrams and Dougan find that while gubernatorial term limits do appear to 
have a negative effect on spending by the state government, once local spending 
is included, this effect disappears.  The other three constitutional restraints, 
including balanced budget amendments, do not appear to have any effect on the 
level on state spending.  
Holtz-Eakin (1988) explores the effect of the Governor’s ability to use a line-
item veto on the size of state expenditures.  The author acknowledges that the 
power to veto a part of a bill rather than the whole bill alters the relative power 
of the executive and legislative branches in a state, but he finds that the line-item 
veto does not have a significant effect on the size of state budgets.  Holtz-Eakin 
uses a variety of dependent variables to proxy for the demand for public goods, 
but does not take into account other constitutional constraints on spending like 
balanced budget amendments, tax and expenditure limits and, of course, sunset 
laws. He does incorporate the distribution of power by political parties, since his 
theory on the changing relative power of the executive and legislative branches 
requires that the governor veto will hold.   
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Rowley, Shughart and Tollison (1988) follow an interest group approach to 
politics in analyzing deficit formations from McCormick and Tollison, where the 
bureaucratic organization is treated as an input in the production function of 
government transfer to interest groups.  Politicians provide a brokering function 
in a market where the demanders of government services are the smaller, well 
organized groups who can effectively lobby for services and the suppliers are the 
larger, more diffuse groups who cannot effectively organize.  They provide the 
transfers, but at a political cost for the brokers.  Politicians therefore balance 
bargains against costs at the margin and establish a market for political wealth 
transfers.     
Zax (1989) looks at the effect of citizen initiative and referendum power on 
the level of state spending. He finds that placing the power to effect policy in the 
hands of the citizenry though vehicles like initiative and referendum increases 
the level of spending by those state governments.  This conclusion runs counter 
to Matsusaka (2004) who uses a cross-sectional approach on a much broader 
sample of data and concludes that initiative and referendum adds efficiency to 
the process of government, lowering combined expenditures from state and local 
government.  
 14
Crain and Miller (1990) also look to address the effects of various 
constitutional constraints on the growth in state spending.  They attempt to deal 
with changes in the behavior of both the executive and legislative branches based 
on not only the various constraints they face, but potential interactions between 
these various constraints.  For example, in a state where a binding constitutional 
balanced budget rule is in place, the line item veto becomes relatively less 
important.  Crain and Miller also take a closer look at differences in particular 
constraints across states.  Specifically, a rule like the line item veto will generate 
different outcomes in states where item-reduction is allowed than those that do 
not.11 Using these enhanced definitions of numerous budgetary restrictions in an 
ordinary least squares regression on cross-sectional data, Crain and Miller find a 
significant negative effect on the growth of state spending to rules like item 
reduction veto and supermajority requirements for tax increase where many 
other papers results were either mixed or inconclusive. 
Alt and Lowery (1994) also look at the role of fiscal institutions like 
restrictions on debt and limitations on revenue generation like supermajority 
voting rules for tax increases in the determination of state government budgets.  
They also consider the political party distribution within the legislative and 
                                                 
11 Item reduction means that the governor is allowed to write in a number that is lower than the 
one suggested in the budget instead of rejecting the item outright. 
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executive branches and the effect of united and divided parties on the response 
to short term disruptions in expected tax revenues, and find these political 
factors to be significantly more important than any of the fiscal institutions.  
They conclude that the level of spending in a state depends on partisan 
preferences, past histories of spending and party control and other exogenous 
variables but do not find a significant effect from debt restrictions or 
supermajority voting requirements on their own. 
Shadbegian (1996) looks at the effect of tax and expenditure limits (TEL) on 
the size and growth of state budgets.  Shadbegian uses state and time fixed 
effects and a term that interacts a TEL dummy and per capita income in the state 
because most state tax and expenditure limits do not prohibit increases in 
spending, but instead they link growth in state government to growth in income 
within the state.  He finds that the inclusion of this interactive term yields a 
strong negative effect of TEL on the growth of state government expenditures. 
Endersby and Towle (1997) look at the impact of constitutional and legal 
controls on two measures of state expenditures; per capita spending and per 
capita debt accumulation.  In addition to attempts to ascertain the effects of items 
like the line item veto and debt and deficit limitations, Endersby and Towle 
expand the analysis to include a political dimension.  Since tools like the line 
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item veto certainly alter the balance of political power by adding to the power of 
the executive branch, the authors reason that the real effects from such restraints 
are likely to be affected by the level of conflict between the executive and 
legislative branches.  They find that the restraints themselves have no significant 
effects on either per capita spending or debt, but that political variables, like a 
unified executive and legislative branch, do appear to have a significant negative 
impact on the level of debt in those states.   
While the question they raise is an interesting and well taken one, Endersby 
and Towle use a very limited sample of data (just three budget cycles) and do not 
appear concerned with balanced budget amendments in drawing their 
conclusions. 
Knight (2000) investigates the effects of supermajority voting requirements 
for tax increases, again using a panel data set from the U.S. States.  He tries 
multiple specifications to address the endogeneity of the process by which the 
states that have adopted such laws make that decision.  He finds that, counter-
intuitively, pro-tax regimes are usually the ones that adopt supermajority voting 
requirements.  He develops a model where moderates in the pro-tax party form 
an alliance with the anti-tax majority in order to set up barriers to the extreme 
pro-tax legislators in increasing taxes. 
 17
The result is that, despite the fact that states with such restrictions have the 
same tax rate as those that do not, once one accounts for the pro-tax nature of 
these states that have adopted these rules12, there is a negative and significant 
effect on tax rates in states that do have these laws. 
Another attempt to consolidate all of the research on constitutional and 
legislative restraints is Besley and Case (2003).  They compile an extensive survey 
of the existing empirical work on such limitations and then utilizes a political 
framework in order to better assess the environment into which these various 
constraints enters. So in addition to the policy making institutions that many of 
the above works have concentrated on and that this paper will concentrate on, 
Besley and Case introduce electoral institutions, like who can run for office, who 
can vote and restrictions on the costs of voting, as well.  They agree with 
Matsusaka’s finding that initiative and referendum generates lower spending.  
Outgoing governor who are prevented from running again by the presence of a 
term limit are associated with lower expenditures, as they are lot as likely to 
endorse wasteful programs that serve a special interest necessary for reelection.  
Besley and Case’s model also predict that fiscal institutions are likely to be moot 
in expenditure determination, as these rules are difficult to enforce and 
                                                 
12 The majority of states that adopted a supermajority voting requirement did so under a 
Democratic controlled legislature or Governorship. 
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politicians are often quite resourceful about finding ways around the letter of the 
law.  Like Abrams and Dougan, they find no effect from the line item veto. Non-
binding limits on deficits are not surprisingly, ineffective.  Besley and Case do 
find that tax and expenditure limits are positively associated with state spending 
levels, but that supermajority voting requirements tend to yield lower levels of 
spending. 
 
THE EVIDENCE:  
In order to test the effect of constitutional and legislative restraints on the size 
of state governments, much of the previous literature focuses on the effect on the 
expenditures of the governments that implement such measures.   
Following Rowley, Shughart and Tollison, I envision a market where the 
bureaucrats are simply agents for the brokers (the politicians) and as such are 
merely an input in the production process for government services (transfers).  
To determine the effect of sunset, it is necessary to determine the effect of the 
adaption of a new “technology” into this production process on the price of these 
political goods.  The adoption of any technology involves accepting a cost, with 
the expectation that this cost will be more than offset by the resulting efficiency 
offered by the innovation.   If the costs outweigh the benefits, there is a decrease 
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in supply from the organization who adopted the new technology.  The resulting 
increase in the price of the commodity decreases the equilibrium quantity in the 
market, but the effect on expenditures is determined by the elasticity of demand 
in the market.  The opposite effects are expected if the benefits from the 
efficiency gained by the adoption of the new technology outweigh the costs of 
implementation.   The equilibrium quantity of the good increases, and again the 
effect on expenditures is determined by the elasticity of demand. 
Such is the case with sunset laws.  There is no question that there are costs 
associated with these laws.  These costs include some direct and obvious costs, 
like the cost of setting up the sunset review board and their support team.  The 
Texas Sunset Advisory Commission acknowledges direct costs of $25 million 
from 1982 to 2007, but this only accounts for the administrative costs of running 
the commission.  It does not take into account the time spent by legislators on 
sunset reviews or the time and resources spent by the agencies being reviewed 
on sunset reviews.   Costs of this type would be highest in the states where the 
most reviews are conducted.  So states with comprehensive review should face 
the highest costs from time and resources spent on reviews.  Selective or 
discretionary states attempt to limit this type of expense by review only agencies 
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that are deemed to need this type of oversight.  Those states should experience 
the lowest levels of these administrative costs and lost time. 
Another criticism of sunset is that it “[puts] targeted agencies on notice and 
activated their latent lobbying power.”13  Agencies that could face sunset reviews 
will have an incentive to try to avoid the process, as it could conceivably result in 
restrictions of the typical operations of the agency or even the elimination of the 
agency.  Those who enjoy the protection of the targeted agency will engage in 
typical rent seeking behavior in order to avoid this fate.  Additionally, once the 
review process begins, there is certainly lobbying that occurs in an effort to 
influence the outcome.  Sunset laws typically provide for the inclusion of the 
“public” into the process by soliciting input prior to the review and by allowing 
testimony during the review process. 
Rent seeking behavior of this sort is wealth destroying, and represents a 
different type of cost than the ones described above.  These lobbying costs are 
likely higher in states using selective or discretionary sunset, and these processes 
involve the extra step of deciding which agencies will be reviewed – which 
provides another margin upon which interested parties can lobby.  In 
comprehensive and regulatory sunset states, no agencies or programs can avoid 
                                                 
13 Kearney, pg. 50 
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the process.  Lobbying certainly still occurs, in an effort to influence the eventual 
recommendations of the sunset board, but the scope of this lobbying is limited by 
the removal of the selection process. 
What benefits can be expected from sunset reviews?  The most obvious is the 
elimination or consolidation of boards, agencies or programs that have either 
become obsolete or in some other way demonstrated themselves to be inefficient.  
Again referring to statistics from the Texas Sunset Advisory Commission, they 
report a savings of over $750 million over their 25-year existence.  But not every 
state reports the volume of closures and consolidations that Texas has 
experienced.  Arizona reports no agency terminations between 1981 and 1985.  
Other states indicate that sunset has actually led to the creation of new agencies.  
Examples include Colorado, where a podiatry board was spun off from an 
existing medical board, and even Texas, which added the Board of Irrigation and 
a Water Commission as the result of sunset reviews.14   
Sunset programs often continue in states even when few entities are being 
discontinued.  Proponents of the system point to studies like those by Lyons and 
Freeman, Curry, and Kearney which indicate that feedback from the legislators 
about sunset is generally favorable.  Even in states where few agencies actually 
                                                 
14 Kearney, pg. 53 
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are dissolved, the lawmakers feel they have a greater ability to oversee the 
actions of these entities than they did without sunset reviews.  There is a sense 
that there is greater accountability for the bureaucrats in these agencies if they 
realize that their actions must be justified every few years.  So beyond the 
immediate fiscal impact, there appears to be evidence of benefits in the form of 
greater management of bureaucracies that might otherwise have gone 
unsupervised.   
With an unknown change in the price of the provision of government 
services, simply looking at expenditures alone will not provide a clear picture of 
the effect of these laws.  It is necessary to add a measure of the quantity of output 
in a state.   To do this, I use the number of state employees as a proxy for the 
quantity of government services. 
To begin, I look simply at the average amount of real per capita expenditures 
in states with sunset laws verses those that do not (Figure 2).  States with sunset 
laws spend slightly less than those with sunset laws.  This difference is not 
statistically significant, so may simply be the result of random variation.  I then 
break the sunset states into their four subcategories, to look for differences 
associated with a particular type of sunset (Figure 3).  Regulatory states have the 
highest average and discretionary states have the lowest, but again, the 
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differences between the states with the four types of sunset and the states 
without sunset are small, and lack statistical significance.  This simple look at the 
data suggests that sunset laws do not have an impact on state expenditures. 
 
MODEL: 
In an effort to model what is occurring with Sunset Laws, it is necessary to 
first take a closer look at the costs and benefits on each side of the ledger.   
The benefits from Sunset come from two possible sources.  First there is the 
cost savings derived from discontinuing an agency.  As described above, this is 
non-existent in some states and infrequent in others, there are cases where 
agencies are discontinued as a result of a sunset review.  If we imagine a state’s 
bureaucracy as having a backlog of such ineffective or obsolete agencies, one 
should expect that the majority of savings from this channel would be realized in 
the first review cycle, where such agencies would be uncovered and 
discontinued.  While it is certainly possible that existing agencies could be 
justifiable in the first review cycle and then later become obsolete, these cases are 
certainly likely to be less common than any closures from the first time through.  
 The second avenue for savings from sunset reviews is savings from the 
improved management of resources by bureaucrats who now have to answer to 
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a sunset review board.  Imagine these boards providing the same oversight 
function that a manager provides for her corporation through the process of 
annual employee reviews.  Individuals whose actions are not periodically 
reviewed will be prone to shirking and to costly mismanagement of agency 
resources.  Just as the manager in a corporate setting provides oversight to try to 
minimize this behavior, the sunset review boards provide an opportunity for the 
legislature to occupy the same role in overseeing the bureaucrats who run an 
agency.  Agencies are often consolidated through the sunset review process and 
responsibilities shifted from one agency to another if deemed appropriate.  
Bureaucrats enter the review cycle understanding that they need to justify their 
own existence.  The higher the budget for the agency, the higher the expectation 
for performance is set.  So bureaucrats who might otherwise have few constraints 
on their spending now have an incentive to utilize resources more efficiently. 
As for costs, the most obvious costs associated with these sunset reviews are 
the costs of running the sunset review agency, and the opportunity cost of time 
spent by both the bureaucrats and the legislators on the sunset review board.  
Both of these costs will be increasing as the number of reviews increase.   
Another important concern regarding these sunset reviews is that they “put 
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targeted agencies on notice and activated their latent lobbying power.15” These 
reviews are open to the public and in fact, they solicit feedback from affected and 
interested parties.  The traditional sunset review process includes a public 
hearing at which public testimony is sought, and many states encourage 
members of the public to provide input to the sunset agency staff in their initial 
assessment of the agency.  The costs associated with lobbying can also be 
subdivided.  Every sunset review board will face pressure and potential rent 
seeking behavior from those who wish to protect their own interest.  For 
example, a state Haircutters and Hairdressers Licensing Agency will receive 
support from its licensed member in an effort to prevent its dissolution.  
Additionally, in states where selective or discretionary sunset laws exist, the 
decision of whether or not to review an agency provides an additional margin 
upon which lobbyists will exert pressure.  
Looking at the benefits that should be expected from the different types of 
Sunset, we find the following relationships: 
 
Benefits from closures (BCL):   
                                                 
15 Kearney, pg. 50 
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Comprehensive review states should get the most benefits here as every 
agency undergoes a review during every review cycle.  In theory, this will 
generate the most reviews and the most closures 
Regulatory review states review every regulatory agency, but not every state 
agency.  As a consequence these states conduct fewer reviews than the 
comprehensive states and should expect fewer agencies to be closed as a result. 
Selective or Discretionary review states will have fewer reviews than the 
comprehensive review states, and could have more or less than the regulatory 
states, depending on how selective they actually are.  But if the reviews are 
conducted strategically – as in agencies whose need is not clearly defined 
undergo reviews more frequently than agencies that are clearly not going to be 
discontinued (the Department of Education for example) – than it is possible that 
they could experience higher benefits from closures than the less strategic 
regulatory review states.  We would not expect them to have more agency 
closures than the comprehensive states, as by definition, the comprehensive 
states will review every agency that the selective or discretionary states review. 
Therefore, 
BCLComp > BCLS/D > BCLREG. 
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In looking at the record of various states with respect to closures we typically 
see few closures, and what closures do occur tend to occur during the first 
review cycle.  Table 3 shows the record of the Texas review board and it supports 
this belief.  The Texas review cycle lasts 12 years.  In the first 30 years of sunset in 
Texas, 33 agencies have been abolished outright – 23 of those 33 were in the first 
12 year cycle.   
Including a dummy for years included in the first sunset cycle indicates no 
significant difference in expenditures during this period when compared to other 
years (Table 7).  This is compelling evidence that the gains which arise from 
sunset are not primarily driven by agency closures. 
 
Benefits from oversight: 
Given that we do not observe frequent agency closings – especially after the 
first sunset cycle, yet the utilization of sunset laws is as high today as it has been 
since its peak in the early 1980s, the benefits from oversight (BOS) must be 
important. 
Once again, the states using comprehensive sunset laws will get the greatest 
amount of savings from this channel as the behavior of every bureaucrat is 
constrained by the specter of an impending sunset review.  States with 
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regulatory review will receive benefits, but from a subset of their agencies, so 
these benefits will be smaller, and states using selective or discretionary review 
will typically receive the fewest benefits from this channel, as they tend to review 
the fewest agencies.  Therefore, 
BOSComp > BOSREG > BOSS/D.  
 
Costs from sunset review board staffing and opportunity cost of time 
Of course, these benefits do not exist in a vacuum.  In order to access the high 
level of potential benefits associated with conducting a large number of sunset 
review, a state must incur a higher level of costs (CT).  The greater the number of 
reviews, the higher the cost.   Therefore, 
CTComp > CTREG > CTS/D  
 
Costs from Lobbying 
Lobbying costs (CL) will not be as closely tied to the volume of reviews, as 
states with selective or discretionary review create an additional margin upon 
which lobbyists can act; the inclusion of an agency in the review process.  
Lobbyists can exert influence at this point, as well as in the review process itself.  
Therefore, 
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CLS/D > CLComp > CLREG. 
   
 
Table 4 summarizes these relationships. 
 
VARIABLES: 
The dependent variables in my regressions are the real level of state 
government expenditures (in 2000 dollars16), the real level of state and local 
combined expenditures, the log of real state government expenditures and the 
number of state employees on the payroll (in full-time equivalents (FTE)).   
Explanatory variables include demographic characteristics like income and 
population along with the presence of other institutions created to limit 
expenditures at the state government level like tax and expenditure limits, line-
item veto power and initiative and referendum.  In the details that follow, I will 
explain the controls used and their expected signs.  The variable of interest are 
dummy variables for sunset and the four individual types of sunset programs. 
Income – State personal income in billions of real (2000) dollars.  
Wagner’s Law, which suggests that government services are a luxury 
good (income elasticity of demand greater than 1), would imply that 
                                                 
16 GDP deflator numbers were obtained from Economic History Services (http://eh.net/hmit/gdp) 
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demand for government services grows as income grows.  This would 
yield a positive relationship between income and government 
expenditures.  The level of wealth in a state is an extremely good predictor 
of the level of expenditures within that state.  A simple regression of the 
level of personal income on the level of state government expenditures 
reveals a positive relationship with an r-squared of nearly .95.  As a result, 
the r-squared values on the main regressions in this paper also very high. 
Population –The level of population in a state in a given year.  
Previous research suggests that there are economies of scale in the 
production of government services, which would generate an inverse 
relationship between population and per capita expenditures.  
Federal – Federal measures the amount of money received by a state 
from the federal government.  Abrams and Dougan (1986), Shadbegian 
(1996), Holtz-Eakin (1988), Matsusaka (2004) all find a positive correlation 
between the level of Federal money available in a state and the level of 
state spending independent of the Federal money.  The reasoning is that 
Federal grants will be a complement to state spending when they come in 
the form of a matching grant, where money is pledged in response to 
spending at the state level.  These expenditures consequently have a lower 
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cost, and therefore lower value projects can be justified under these 
circumstances.  Another possibility is that the Federal money acts as a 
substitute for state spending, which would generate a negative coefficient 
on this variable.   
TEL – A dummy variable indicating the presence of tax and 
expenditure limits. Abrams and Dougan find no effect from tax and 
expenditure limits. Shadbegian finds a significant decrease in spending 
from the presence of tax and expenditure limits, but only when they are 
interacted with per capita income, as these limits are often tied to the level 
of growth in the state.  Besley and Case find that such limits actually 
increase spending.  Given the mixed results in the literature for tax and 
expenditure limits, no prediction is made as to the direction of the change 
in spending. 
Line Item Veto – A dummy variable indicating that the governor has 
the ability to alter the level of spending associated with a bill.  Holtz-Eakin 
finds that while the balance of power between the governor and the 
legislature is altered by the presence of a line-item veto, there is no 
significant effect on state level expenditures. Crain and Miller find a 
decrease in the growth of state spending when looking at states with item 
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reduction power. Abrams and Dougan, Endersby and Towle and Besley 
and Case find that line item veto has no effect. 
Term Limits – A dummy variable indicating the presence of a term 
limitation preventing the governor from seeking reelection after a certain 
period in office.  Only 1 state (Virginia) allows just a single term, and only 
1 state (Utah) allows more than 2 terms, so this is simply an indicator of 
the presence of a constraint and does not account for these slight 
differences.  Dougan and Abrams find that term limits appear to limit 
state spending, but only until local spending is added. 
Shared budget – A dummy variable with a value of 1 in states where 
the budgetary process is shared by the executive and legislative branch.  
In these states a budget is prepared by both the governor and the 
legislature, as opposed to states where the creation of the budget happens 
in the legislature and is presented to the governor.  Like the line item veto, 
this will affect the balance of power in state government. 
Supermajority - A dummy variable indicating supermajority voting 
requirements for tax increases.  Crain and Miller find a decrease in the 
growth in state spending from supermajority tax requirements.  After for 
correcting for the endogenous selection of these rules by “high-tax 
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regimes”, Knight also finds a negative effect on state spending from 
supermajority requirements.  Besley and Case also find a significant 
negative association here. 
Initiative and Referendum – A dummy variable indicating the use of 
initiative and referendum.  Matsusaka finds that the use of initiative and 
referendum has a significant negative on state government expenditures.  
Over the last 30 years there has only been one change in the use of 
initiative and referendum (Rhode Island adopted its use in 1996).  As a 
result, this variable is dropped from the two-way fixed effects regression, 
as insufficient variation exists within the studied time period. 
Sunset – A dummy variable indicating the presence of sunset laws in 
the state for a given year.  If sunset laws are a cost-effective way to reduce 
spending in state government, then we would expect a negative sign to 
this variable.  If the time and money spent on these review is wasteful, 
then a positive sign can be expected. 
Sunrise – Another development along with sunset laws was the 
implementation of “Sunrise” laws.  Often agencies that were terminated 
one year would be re-instated the following year.  Sunrise laws require 
that each agency proposed by the legislature must undergo a review to 
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justify the cost of its program before it begins operation.  This practice 
began in Tennessee in 1977 and has since been added in 8 other states.  
Sunrise is a dummy variable indicating the presence of sunrise laws in a 
state in a given year.  Sign may be positive or negative following similar 
logic to sunset laws. 
Comprehensive – A dummy variable indicating the presence of 
comprehensive sunset review.  Costs in terms of time spent by both 
legislators on the sunset board and the bureaucrats of the reviewed 
agency in providing evidence of their effectiveness are highest here, as the 
most reviews happen under this regime.  Lobbying costs are likely lower 
here, as there is no possibility of avoiding the review through effective 
lobbying.  If savings are generated from the oversight provided by the 
sunset review process, it would also be expected to be most effective in 
states where all bureaus, agencies and boards are subject to such 
oversight.   
Regulatory – A dummy variable indicating the presence of sunset 
review for all regulatory agencies within a state.  Expectations for these 
states are similar to those of comprehensive, but on a smaller scale.  There 
will be lower costs from fewer reviews. Lobbying costs should be 
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similarly low, but if benefits are accruing from oversight there is 
consequently less potential benefit as fewer programs are subject to this 
level of review. 
Selective – A dummy variable indicating a state that allows for 
selective implementation of sunset reviews.  In these states, sunset 
reviews are concentrated on entities like occupational licensing and 
administrative agencies like highway, health and education 
departments.17 The determination of an entity’s sunset status is typically 
set upon the statutory creation of that entity.  Selective states will undergo 
fewer sunset reviews than comprehensive sunset states, so face lower 
costs, but generate less oversight. They can generate a similar number of 
reviews as regulatory sunset states. The most likely difference between 
selective and regulatory is the potential for additional lobbying activity 
involving the decision to designate an entity as subject to sunset or not, 
and additional costs associated with this behavior. 
Discretionary – A dummy variable indicating the presence of sunset 
review on a discretionary basis.  The sunset review board in these states 
has the ability to select which entities will face review.  Lobbying costs are 
                                                 
17 Hamm and Robertson, pg. 140 
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consequently highest in these states.  The number of reviews conducted is 
lower than in comprehensive states, but could be similar to either 
regulatory or selective.   
 
RESULTS: 
To empirically test the effect of sunset laws on the size of state governments, I 
employ 2 different measures of government size.  For Models I and II, the 
dependent variable is the real level of state and local government expenditures18 
and for Models III and IV, the dependent variable is the real level of state 
government expenditures (excluding local expenditures).  The behavior of states 
varies with respect to spending at the state verses the local level.  While some 
states might require certain spending (like public education) to be included in the 
local state budget numbers, others will address this at the state level.  Because of 
this difference in approach, I felt it appropriate to investigate it from both 
perspectives to determine if there were significant changes to my results.  Models 
I through IV use year fixed effects, but an f-test to determine the appropriateness 
of utilizing state fixed effects in addition to the year effects failed to reject the 
                                                 
18 In Year 2000 dollars 
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hypothesis that the state effects were statistically different from one another, so 
state fixed effects are not employed. 
 The results I report exclude data from Alaska, as the Alaskan government 
receives significant revenues from severance taxes on oil, and consequently their 
per capita expenditures are far out of line with per capita expenditure levels in 
other states19 for reasons that have nothing to do with their use of sunset laws. 
Models I and III treat all sunset programs equally in an attempt to determine 
a general effect of sunset laws, while Model II and IV break states with sunset 
laws into the their subtypes; comprehensive, regulatory, selective and 
discretionary.   
In all 4 models, personal income numbers are as expected: the coefficient on 
personal income is positive and significant, indicating that government services 
are a luxury good.  The coefficient on population is negative and significant for 
all four models, reflecting economies of scale in the provision of government 
services.  Federal money appears to be a complement to state spending when 
state effects are ignored, as states with higher levels of Federal Funds available to 
them also spend more of their own money.   
                                                 
19 For example, Alaska’s per capita expenditures vary from 3 to 31 times that of Alabama. 
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Looking to the other constraints on state spending used by the states, like 
much of the literature, I also find a mixed bag of results.  Tax and expenditure 
limits do not appear to have an effect in Models I and II where the state and local 
spending is comingled, but once I look only at state level expenditures, these 
limits provide a negative coefficient which is significant at the 5% level for Model 
III, but remains insignificant in Model IV.   Line item veto power is similarly 
insignificant in Models I and II, but once the focus turned to state level spending, 
there appears to a positive influence on the level of state expenditures.  This 
result runs contrary to the existing literature, which finds wither no effect or a 
slightly negative effect of line item vetoes.   Term limits and shared budgetary 
power both exert a significant negative influence on state government 
expenditures in all four models.  Supermajority voting requirements appear to 
have a large, positive influence on the level of state and local spending, but this 
effect disappears once the local spending is eliminated from consideration.   
Following the conclusion of Matsusaka, I find that initiative and referendum 
does appear to offer savings at the state level.  
Models I and III focus on sunsets as a generic entity, ignoring the differences 
of the different programs utilized across the country.  Controlling for all of the 
above variable, both models indicate a negative impact from the programs, and 
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when looking only at state level expenditures, this effect is statistically 
significant.   
In models II and IV, sunset programs are separated into their subcategories; 
comprehensive, regulatory, selective and discretionary.  Breaking the sunset 
programs down to look at the different types of program allows an examination 
of differences based on the different costs and benefits associated with these 
different types of reviews.  Model II offers some weak evidence that the 
comprehensive and selective programs have measurable effects on state 
spending levels.    
In Model IV, comprehensive, regulatory and selective sunset programs all 
appear to offer significant savings at the state level.  The question then becomes 
is this savings from the closure of agencies or from the oversight that is provided 
on an on-going basis.  Anecdotal evidence from early sunset investigations and 
from the data from the Texas sunset commission appear to indicate that closures 
are either rare or they are concentrated in the early years of sunset.  Given the 
results of Models III and IV, this would imply that the results of sunset come 
from ongoing oversight rather than simply from closures. 
To test this proposition, I utilize a dummy variable for years that fall within a 
state’s first sunset review cycle.  The number of years designated as the sunset 
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review cycle varies wildly, from as few as four years (Alabama, Delaware, Ohio) 
to as many as 15 (Colorado recently expanded the review cycle to 15 years).  This 
dummy variable is interacted with the sunset indicator in Model V and the four 
sunset type indictors in Model VI.  If the gains from sunset are from agency 
closure, the negative impact of sunset laws should be evident and possibly even 
amplified in these years.  If the effect decreases or even disappears, this offers 
strong evidence for the oversight hypothesis, as this effect would continued into 
later cycles, and could possibly even be at its weakest in the first cycle, as the 
oversight technically has not even occurred yet (although the threat of oversight 
certainly exists at this point).  Additionally, we should expect to see no 
significant changes to any of the coefficients on the non-sunset independent 
variables 
Table 7 provides the results.  As expected, by concentrating on just the first 
sunset cycle, none of the non-sunset coefficients are disturbed in any significant 
manner.  In Model V, notice that while the coefficient on states with sunset laws 
remains negative, the effect is noticeably weaker and it loses its statistical 
significance.  So the savings of sunset programs in general are not concentrated 
in the early clean-up years.  In Model VI, the comprehensive sunset programs 
continue to offer savings at a comparable rate as in Model IV.  Notice the effects 
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on the other three vehicles.  No measurable effects exist, which is again 
consistent with the hypothesis that savings from sunset laws are not closely 
associated with agency closures, but rather should be attributed to the increased 
oversight and management that these programs offer.  
So if sunset laws are offering savings at the state expenditure level the 
question then becomes; is this savings from a reduction in the level of 
government services, or is it from a decrease in the cost of providing these 
services? 
The quantity of services provided by the government is certainly a subjective 
concept, but in an effect to quantify it, I use the number of employees in state 
government (in full-time equivalents (FTE)) as the dependent variable.  Given 
that states using sunset laws are spending less than the states that are not, if the 
savings is coming from a reduction in the level of services, one would expect to 
see fewer employees utilized by the state.  If the sunset states are benefitting 
from efficiency generated from the oversight that sunset provides, then it is 
entirely possible that these states would actually be employing more employees 
and providing more services20.   
                                                 
20 The number of additional employees directly associated with providing sunset reviews is likely 
trivial, so it is unlikely that the results displayed here reflect increased employment that directly 
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First a few non-sunset related observations from table 8.  Population and 
federal funds are both strongly associated with more employees in state 
government and this should meet with expectations.  Bigger states clearly 
require more services, and more federal funds injected into the budget allows for 
more state government employees as well.  We found earlier that states that use 
line item vetoes spend more, and here we see that they also provide more 
services.  While states with term limits and initiative and referendum may be 
achieving their savings through a reduction in the level of services, as reflected in 
the significant decrease in the number of employees in these states, all else equal.  
As for sunset, the story is not quite as cut and dry.  While the coefficient 
associated with the number of state employees is positive for sunset states, the 
result is not a strong one.   Comprehensive and regulatory sunset states offer 
lower expenditures with a higher level of services, but there is no clear effect in 
terms of the level of services for the selective and discretionary states. 
When considering institutions like tax and expenditure limits and 
supermajority voting rules along with sunset laws in explaining the level of state 
expenditures, there is the possibility of endogeneity in the resulting analysis.  If 
any of the independent variables used in the above analysis predict the use of 
                                                                                                                                                 
results from sunset programs.  Even if it did, given that the expenditures are lower in these states, 
this would have to be considered an acceptable cost. 
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sunset laws within a given state, then the results may be biased due to this 
endogeneity.  The following section uses a hazard model to attempt to identify 
conditions that make it more likely that a given state will adopt sunset laws. 
 
WHICH STATES CHOOSE SUNSET? 
The introduction of sunset laws in 1976 was an innovation, and like any 
innovation other firms in the industry will try to adopt this innovation while 
simultaneously looking to improve upon the original idea.  All innovations have 
costs and benefits to their implementation and the more efficiency provided by 
an innovation the more rapidly that idea will disperse and be adopted.  In the 
case of sunset laws, the dispersion was initially very rapid – 28 states adopted 
Colorado’s innovation by the next legislative cycle – but was not universal.  At its 
peak, sunset was used in 36 of the 50 states.  The lack of universal acceptance 
stems from questions about how much efficiency is gained through sunset when 
weighed against the costs and is the subject of the previous chapter.  Another 
interesting question about this innovation relates to the dispersion of the idea.  
Why did some states adopt sunset, while others decided not to?  Is it possible to 
identify characteristics that make a state more or less likely to adopt a sunset 
law? 
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The dispersion of ideas has been investigated in a wide variety of disciplines. 
Theories on diffusion have their origin in the physical sciences.  For a long time, 
scientists sought to explain the factors that led to the spread of a biological agent 
like a virus.  The spread of genetic material has also been carefully studied. From 
these origins, diffusion theory has expanded into the social sciences.  From the 
spread of cultural norms to the spread of innovations, it is widely believed that a 
similar mechanism drives the diffusion of all of these things.  
The common thread through much of this literature is that of a physical 
proximity.  To catch a cold, you need to be near the carrier of the virus.  There is 
an obvious physical component to the spread of genetic materials – it is more 
likely to occur with neighboring societies.  But also with societies with whom one 
might have contact. 
Even the spread of ideas (cultural norms, religion, innovation) initially was 
dependent on the physical “closeness” of two entities.  But with advances in 
communication, it is no longer necessary to live in a nearby town to share the 
idea/innovation of another.  Analyses of the dissemination of ideas, both in 
industry and in government, concentrates less on proximity and more on 
economic, political and sociodemographic characteristics.   
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A few examples: 
Economic: Government services are considered to be a luxury good, 
and typically the greater the wealth of a state, the higher the demand for 
government services in that state.  I will initially employ both per capita 
income and the level of state expenditures in these regression, but 
concerns about multicollinearity will lead me to use just per capita income 
for the bulk of the study. 
Political:  The use of other institutions designed to limit expenditures 
at the state level is likely to indicate a high degree of sensitivity to state 
government expenditures and one would suspect these states would be 
more likely to implement sunset laws.  I look at term limits, line item veto, 
tax and expenditure limits, supermajority voting requirements and 
initiative and referendum.  Since several of the tools are used consistently 
by individual states over time, the lack of variation in the sample leads to 
problems in the analysis and I combine the dummy variables associated 
with each of these into a single index.  This index simply counts up the 
number of different expenditure control measures in existence in a given 
state and provides a number from zero to five based on this information. 
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Sociodemographic:  One only additional demographic variable I use is 
population density in an attempt to measure the degree of urbanization in 
a given state.  Urbanization is often associated with a higher level of 
innovation in both private industry and government, so states with higher 
population densities are expected to implement an innovation like sunset 
laws more quickly.  Additionally I look to see if one particular political 
party favors the adoption of sunset laws over another.  Sunset proponents 
promote sunset as a non-partisan measure, so I have no prior belief 
regarding which party is more likely to adopt sunset laws.  Several studies 
have also looked at the implementation of new laws when the legislature 
is unified (both house and senate are controlled by the same party), 
finding that it is easier for an innovation to be accepted under such 
circumstances. 
Additionally I look at a measure of proximity. I measure proximity to 
sunset laws in two ways – miles between the state’s capital city and capital 
city of the nearest sunset state, and the percent of state borders that touch 
a sunset state.  Given the ease of communication, and vehicles like state 
budget officer associations, I do not expect proximity to be a major driver 
of the adoption of sunset. 
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In this section, I will attempt to identify which characteristics made states 
more likely to adopt a sunset program.  In this inquiry it will be important to 
consider the timing of the decision as well as the decision itself.  As indicated 
above, numerous states adopted sunset programs in the legislative cycle 
following their introduction, while others waited for an additional cycle or two.  
After a long period when sunset programs were more likely to be discontinued 
than implemented, recent years have produced an increase in the popularity of 
sunset laws, and some states have reinstituted retired programs, and a few have 
even turned to sunset after more than two decades of deciding against them. 
 
HAZARD RESULTS: 
To begin I ran a set of hazard regressions to determine if any of my 
explanatory variables were in fact driving the adoption of sunset laws within 
particular states.  Table 9 offers the first set of results.  The dependent variable in 
all of the regressions will be a dummy variable on the presence of sunset laws.  
Once a state adopts a sunset law, they are not eligible to add sunset in the 
following period, so further observations from this state are truncated.  Each 
model contains a measure of geographic closeness to other sunset states – 
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measured as the distance between state capitals.21  As you can see, this initial 
approach lacks explanatory power for virtually every variable.  Using various 
combinations in an attempt to determine if political party or the unity of the 
legislature or the legislature and governor fails to uncover a statistically 
significant relationship.  There is some slight evidence that the presence of sunset 
laws in nearby states leads to a higher likelihood of adopting sunset.  But given 
the lack of explanatory of the rest of these specifications, this relationship must 
be taken lightly at this point. 
Table 10 contains the same basic regressions, but with expenditures omitted 
as they are strongly correlated with per capita income, causing some concern 
regarding multicollinearity.  The strength of the results improves only 
marginally from this change.  The presence of term limits has a consistent, 
positive impact on the likelihood of adopting sunset, and is significant at the 10% 
level in Models 1 and 4.  Sunset laws are also more likely to be adopted in 
wealthy states.  
But there are still collinearity problems stemming from the lack of variation in 
the use of many of the other institutions which attempt to control state 
government expenditures (term limits, tax and expenditure limits, supermajority 
                                                 
21
 These regressions were also run using the percentage of states with shared border which had sunset in 
place (following Crain, 1966), but the results were even weaker. 
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voting rules, Initiative and referendum).  In table 11, I use a single variable for 
the presence of such institutions, where the value ranges from zero to five, 
representing the number of different institutions used.  Since the general 
hypothesis for the inclusion of these variables is that a population that has 
adopted innovations designed to constrain the spending of the state government 
before will be more likely to do so again with sunset, these seems to be a 
reasonable approach.  The results remain far from robust, with only the 
proximity measure yielding any consistent results, again indicating at least a 
weak increase in the likelihood of implementing sunset base on what nearby 
states are doing. 
Shughart and Tollison (1985) use two unique measures regarding the state 
legislature as they attempt to explain the dissemination of corporate chartering 
laws; legislative size and the ratio of house size to senate size.  The size of the 
legislature could have two possible effects.  First, a large legislature may face a 
higher cost to passing laws simply from the simple logistics of working with a 
larger body of individuals, meaning that these states would have a lower 
likelihood of adopting sunset laws. Conversely, the increase in size also creates 
greater opportunity for lobbyist to capture votes at a low cost, leading to an 
increase in the adoption of new programs if these programs have an active 
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sponsor, as sunset laws did with Common Cause.  A higher ratio of house to 
senate members likely increases the cost to special interests in promoting a bill.  
If the marginal cost of obtaining votes increases at an increasing rate, the extra 
expense of obtaining a large number of votes in a large house outweighs the 
savings from the smaller senate body. The wider the disparity, the stronger the 
effect is expected to be, decreasing the likelihood of adopting new laws. 
Table 12 looks at the adoption of sunset laws using these measures, and while 
Shughart and Tollison find that legislative size leads to earlier adoption of 
corporate chartering laws and greater house-to-senate ratios do appear to slow 
the adoption of these new laws, I am unable to replicate this result for sunset 
laws. 
 
CONCLUSION: 
Evidence on the effectiveness of the various constitutional and statutory 
limitations on state government suggests that these institutions do have effects 
on the size of state government.  I find that sunset laws also have an effect on the 
level of state government expenditures and that it is the intended effect (lower 
level of spending) despite the fact that this savings comes from an unexpected 
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source (oversight) rather than the wholesale agency closures envisioned by 
earlier proponents of these programs.  
Sunset laws are only utilized in 30 states. Given the evidence offered above, it 
is apparent these programs can lower government expenditures and lower the 
cost of providing government services when properly implemented.  Proper 
implementation means that sunset laws should be implemented more broadly, 
either universally across all regulatory agencies or universally across all 
programs but not at the discretion of the sunset agency, as this may allow for too 
much access for lobbyists who want to keep their program off the sunset docket. 
 These approaches offer more savings, despite higher costs of 
implementation, because the savings from these programs appears to be the 
result of increased management and oversight resulting from the auditing 
process inherent in sunset reviews.  Bureaucrats are employees like any 
employee in any corporation.  Without supervision, wasteful behaviors will be 
undertaken, resulting in higher costs and lower outputs.  Corporations long ago 
implemented mandatory reviews for all employees in order to attempt to limit 
this waste.  Sunset laws, properly implemented, afford that same benefit to state 
governments.   
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Additionally, universal implementation limits access of special interest 
groups who will try to protect the agencies that serve their interests by removing 
them from the sunset umbrella.  Selective or discretionary implementation 
provide an additional access point for lobbying activity of this type, leading to 
rent seeking behavior that increases costs.   
 
 53
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 54
Appendix A 
Table A.1: Sunset States – 1981 and 2005 
1981 Sunset States 
Comprehensive Regulatory Selective 
 Alabama   Alaska   Nevada  
 Arizona   Colorado   Pennsylvania  
 Arkansas   Connecticut   South Dakota  
 Delaware   Florida   West Virginia  
 Indiana   Georgia   Wyoming  
 Louisiana   Hawaii    
 Mississippi   Illinois    
 Oklahoma   Kansas    
 Rhode Island   Maine    
 Tennessee   Maryland    
 Texas   Montana    
 Washington   New Mexico    
 Nebraska   North Carolina    
 New Hampshire   Oregon    
   South Carolina    
   Utah    
   Vermont    
 
2005 Sunset States 
Comprehensive Regulatory Selective 
 Alabama   Colorado   Arkansas  
 Alaska   Georgia   California  
 Arizona   Hawaii   Connecticut  
 Delaware   Illinois   Indiana  
 Florida   Kentucky   Maine  
 Louisiana   Maryland   Nebraska  
 Ohio   Missouri   Texas  
 Tennessee   New Mexico   West Virginia  
 Utah   Pennsylvania   Vermont  
 Washington     Virginia  
     Oklahoma  
 55
 
Table A.222: Sunset Principles – 
First: The programs or agencies covered under the law should automatically 
terminate on a date certain, unless affirmatively recreated by law. 
Second: Termination should be periodic (e.g., every 6 or 8 years) in order to 
institutionalize the process of reevaluation. 
Third: Like all significant innovations, introduction of the Sunset mechanism will 
be a learning process and should be phased in gradually, beginning with those 
programs to which it seems most applicable. 
Fourth: Programs and agencies in the same policy area should be reviewed 
simultaneously in order to encourage consolidation and responsible pruning. 
Fifth: Consideration by the relevant legislative committees must be preceded by 
competent and thorough preliminary studies. 
Sixth: Existing bodies (e.g., the executive agencies, General Accounting Offices) 
should undertake the preliminary evaluation work, but their evaluation 
capacities must be strengthened. 
Seventh: Substantial committee reorganization, including adoption of a system of 
rotation of committee members, is a prerequisite to effective Sunset oversight. 
Eighth: In order to facilitate review, the Sunset proposal should establish general 
criteria to guide the review and evaluation process. 
Ninth: Safeguards must be built into the Sunset mechanism to guard against 
arbitrary termination and to provide for outstanding agency obligations and 
displaced personnel. 
Tenth: Public participation in the form of public access to information and public 
hearings is an essential part of the Sunset process. 
 
                                                 
22
 Adams, Sherman, pg 78-79 
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Table A.3 - History of Sunset Commission Action – Texas – 1979 to 2007 
 
 
 
Legislative 
Session 
 
 
Agencies 
Continued 
 
Agencies 
Abolished 
Outright 
Agencies 
Abolished 
& functions 
transferred 
 
 
Agencies 
Consolidated 
 
 
Agencies 
Separated 
 
 
Agencies 
Reviewed 
66th – 1979 12 8 1 4 1 26 
67th – 1981 22 2 3 1 0 28 
68th – 1983 29 3 0 0 0 32 
69th – 1985 24 6 0 0 1 31 
70th – 1987 18 1 1 0 0 20 
71st – 1989 25 3 3 1 0 30 
72nd – 1991 23 3 3 1 0 30 
73rd – 1993 27 1 1 2 0 31 
74th – 1995 16 0 2 0 0 18 
75th – 1997 19 0 2 0 0 21 
76th – 1999 22 1 0 2 0 25 
77th – 2001 21 1 0 1 0 25* 
78th – 2003 23 1 2 0 0 29* 
79th – 2005 21 2 3 1 0 29* 
80th – 2007 14 1 1 0 0 23* 
* Some agencies reviewed were not subject to continuation or abolishment or had their Sunset date removed. Also 
includes other special reviews and projects. 
Source: Sunset Advisory Commission: Guide to the Texas Sunset Process 
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Table A.4 – Cost and Benefit breakdown for sunset states 
 Benefits Costs 
 Closure Oversight Staff/Time Lobbying 
Comprehensive High High High Low 
Regulatory  Low Med Med Low 
Selective/Discretionary High to 
Med 
Low Low High 
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Table A.5 – Summary Statistics 
Variable 
       
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Real State Expenses - 
General Fund (in millions) 1409 7069.90 9045.42 326.94 76223.63 
Real Per Capita State 
Expenses - General Fund 1409 1297.43 517.34 435.65 3538.58 
State Employees - FTE 588 301714.70 316016.70 30266 1805446 
Real State and Local 
Expenses (in millions) 1323 25278.78 33694.05 1445.61 305598.30 
Real Personal Income (in 
billions) 1421 126.50 154.13 7.08 1195.90 
Population (in thousands) 1421 5195253 5558492 411530 36000000 
Real Federal Funds (in 
millions) 1323 4.239 5.525 0.409 49.660 
Tax and Expenditure 
Limits 1421 0.410 0.492 0 1 
Line Item Veto - Amount 1421 0.842 0.365 0 1 
Term Limits 1425 0.641 0.480 0 1 
Shared Budget 1421 0.152 0.359 0 1 
Supermajority 1421 0.200 0.400 0 1 
Sunset 1421 0.517 0.500 0 1 
Comprehensive 1421 0.177 0.382 0 1 
Regulatory 1421 0.238 0.426 0 1 
Selective 1421 0.113 0.316 0 1 
Discretionary 1421 0.011 0.102 0 1 
Sunrise 1421 0.106 0.308 0 1 
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Table A.6 – Regression results:  Real State and Local Expenditures (in millions) 
for Model I and II, Real General Fund State Expenditures for Model III and IV 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Constant -3088.592*** -3186.625*** -107.528 -102.687 
 (590.391) (601.045) (435.377) (439.894) 
Personal Income 152.175*** 154.701*** 59.595*** 58.552*** 
 (7.228) (7.385) (4.046) (4.126) 
Population -1283.133*** -1327.072*** -374.150*** -356.493*** 
 (160.474) (162.748) (85.808) (86.102) 
Federal Funds 3267.737*** 3248.855*** 297.520*** 308.244*** 
 (115.42) (117.176) (74.229) (75.045) 
Tax and Expenditure Limits 100.44 -57.521 -211.686** -171.041 
 (163.199) (174.319) (104.211) (108.991) 
Line Item Veto 28.527 129.437 618.757*** 591.540*** 
 (155.654) (165.402) (124.593) (123.656) 
Term Limits -704.841*** -667.079*** -338.804*** -328.542*** 
 (190.742) (190.712) (112.284) (113.328) 
Shared Budget -978.095*** -902.403*** -1132.947*** -1183.627*** 
 (268.469) (271.356) (196.234) (199.301) 
Supermajority 1051.706*** 892.912*** 109.667 203.079 
 (232.082) (241.035) (151.246) (165.031) 
Initiative and Referendum -3.142 65.378 -1041.572*** -1114.028*** 
 (144.584) (146.388) (88.563) (89.155) 
Sunset -184.644  -538.672***  
 (163.52)  (108.432)  
Comprehensive  435.227**  -751.069*** 
  (214.916)  (162.977) 
Regulatory  -259.044  -344.300*** 
  (160.259)  (102.029) 
Selective  -669.331**  -569.057*** 
  (301.42)  (184.121) 
Discretionary  242.654  256.121 
  (657.11)  (336.879) 
Sunrise 1228.331*** 1028.65*** 392.599*** 375.8343*** 
 (212.411) (206.056) (120.863) (122.907) 
N 1311 1311 1311     1311 
R2 0.993 0.993 .9594 .9596 
Note: Year fixed effects utilized in each of the four models, but results are not reported here
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Table A.7 – Regression results: First Cycle - Real General Fund State 
Expenditures 
Variable Model V Model VI 
Constant -326.07 -314.193 
 (438.306) (435.983) 
Personal Income 59.221*** 58.343*** 
 (4.160) (4.173) 
Population -370.399*** -346.274*** 
 (88.142) (87.364) 
Federal Funds 306.215*** 303.744*** 
 (74.751) (73.630) 
Tax and Expenditure Limits -253.741** -191.71* 
 (103.631) (100.466) 
Line Item Veto 659.209*** 675.814*** 
 (129.578) (130.018) 
Term Limits -402.605*** -418.594*** 
 (113.707) (110.943) 
Shared Budget -1185.681*** -1174.426*** 
 (202.419) (198.708) 
Supermajority 67.269 116.349 
 (149.612) (156.478) 
Initiative and Referendum -1027.561*** -1056.316*** 
 (88.395) (88.435) 
Sunset - First Cycle -216.771  
 (149.228)  
Comprehensive - First Cycle  -831.752*** 
  (291.004) 
Regulatory - First Cycle  112.300 
  (123.862) 
Selective - First Cycle  -83.140 
  (223.504) 
Discretionary - First Cycle  -447.889 
  (418.443) 
Sunrise - First Cycle  -125.095 
  (394.328) 
N 1311 1311 
R2 0.959 0.959 
Note: Year fixed effects utilized in each of the four models, but results are not reported here 
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Table A.8: Regression Results: State Employees (Full-Time Equivalent) 
 Model VII Model VIII 
Constant 16014.324*** 15891.215*** 
 (5230.773) (5579.654) 
Personal Income -266.532 -259.641 
 (148.175) (151.830) 
Population 47815.176*** 47709.533*** 
 (4324.877) (4330.439) 
Federal Funds 9436.221*** 9363.959*** 
 (1370.984) (1429.826) 
TEL -2186.168 -2572.837 
 (3074.503) (3154.834) 
Line Item 14162.268*** 14307.422*** 
 (2670.820) (2971.282) 
Term Limits -17759.135*** -18169.503*** 
 (5255.725) (5168.651) 
Shared Budget 12980.277 13659.371 
 (5715.106) (6372.924) 
Supermajority -11342.908*** -12347.115*** 
 (2827.011) (3494.016) 
Initiative and Referendum -14454.027*** -13871.136*** 
 (2791.390) (2928.924) 
Sunset 6274.894  
 (4019.054)  
Comprehensive  8868.143** 
  (4358.100) 
Regulatory  6541.631* 
  (3929.014) 
Selective  5763.633 
  (7197.200) 
Discretionary  -324.083 
  (4844.665) 
Sunrise 2794.765 2244.164 
 (3167.832) (3012.165) 
N 490 490 
R2 0.988 0.877 
Note: Year fixed effects utilized in each of the four models, but results are not reported 
here 
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Table A.9 – Preliminary Hazard regressions. Dependent variable = 1 if year 
sunset adopted, 0 if no sunset).   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant -3.114 -3.335 -3.244 -3.694 -2.899 
 (2.245) (2.288) (2.263) (2.355) (2.200) 
Tax and Expenditure limits -0.929 -0.885 -0.937 -0.860 -0.945 
 (0.767) (0.755) (0.749) (0.753) (0.736) 
Term Limits 1.076 0.888 0.838 0.917 0.811 
 (0.666) (0.626) (0.615) (0.627) (0.609) 
Line Item Veto -1.824 -1.952 -1.715 -1.718 -1.507 
 (1.494) (1.448) (1.366) (1.445) (1.402) 
Supermajority -2.753 -3.275 -3.755 -2.310 -3.972 
 (3.681) (4.442) (5.174) (3.287) (3.781) 
Initiative and Referendum -1.337 -0.027 3.943 -0.861 3.612 
 (4.827) (4.754) (5.952) (4.038) (5.060) 
Real General Expenditures  0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 
(in millions) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
Real Personal Income per capita 0.271 0.243 0.080 0.243 0.066 
(in thousands) (0.349) (0.301) (0.242) (0.344) (0.233) 
Republican Senate -0.761     
 (0.980)     
Republican House 0.121     
 (0.899)     
Republican Governor -0.291 -0.488 -0.444 0.189  
 (0.648) (0.627) (0.620) (0.876)  
Nearest Sunset 0.00108* 0.00094 0.00099 0.00103 0.00107 
 (0.00064) (0.00063) (0.00063) (0.00064) (0.00061) 
Population Density -0.0003 -0.00084 -0.00036 -0.00097 -0.00006 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Hazard term -0.914 -1.038* -1.025* -0.933 -0.936 
 (0.607) (0.607) (0.615) (0.592) (0.595) 
Republican Legislature   -0.077    
  (1.131)    
Democratic Legislature   0.566    
  (0.990)    
Unified Legislature    0.337   
   (0.924)   
Democratic Legis. and Governor    0.595  
    (0.962)  
NOTE: Because of a lack of variation in some of these variables I was unable to include Republican Legislature and 
Governor 
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Table A.10 – Hazard regressions: Alternate Specification - Dependent variable = 
1 if year sunset adopted, 0 if no sunset).    
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant -3.489 -3.581 -3.577 -3.555 -3.178 
 (2.176) (2.214) (2.198) (2.291) (2.124) 
Tax and Expenditure limits -0.881 -0.879 -0.900 -0.882 -0.918 
 (0.708) (0.700) (0.694) (0.699) (0.685) 
Term Limits 1.176* 0.990 0.988 1.052* 0.935 
 (0.659) (0.623) (0.620) (0.633) (0.612) 
Line Item Veto -1.557 -1.682 -1.568 -1.435 -1.362 
 (1.466) (1.406) (1.337) (1.444) (1.386) 
Supermajority 0.691 0.624 0.620 0.483  
 (0.788) (0.778) (0.760) (0.778)  
Initiative and Referendum 0.538 0.633 0.632 0.629  
 (0.751) (0.729) (0.728) (0.723)  
0.170* 0.188* 0.184* 0.177* 0.148 Real Personal Income per 
capita (in thousands) (0.102) (0.106) (0.105) (0.104) (0.096) 
Republican Senate -0.560     
 (0.958)     
Republican House 0.243     
 (0.899)     
Republican Governor -0.343 -0.522 -0.517 -0.198  
 (0.646) (0.625) (0.624) (0.909)  
Nearest Sunset 0.00101 0.00086 0.00086 0.00096 0.00098 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Population Density -0.00043 -0.00095 -0.00077 -0.00097 -0.00038 
 (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.00181) (0.00164) 
Hazard term -1.000* -1.128* -1.141* -1.004* -1.014* 
 (0.604) (0.608) (0.611) (0.589) (0.581) 
Republican Legislature    0.160    
  (1.130)    
Democratic 
Legislature  0.448   
  (0.984)    
Unified Legislature  0.350   
   (0.927)   
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Table A.11 - Hazard regressions: Statutory Limitations Indexed. Dependent 
variable = 1 if year sunset adopted, 0 if no sunset).    
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant -4.029** -3.895** -3.886** -4.375** -3.798** 
 (1.759) (1.930) (1.927) (1.954) (1.717) 
Other Limitations 0.191 0.159 0.168 0.163 0.164 
 (0.252) (0.244) (0.244) (0.244) (0.243) 
0.080 0.110 0.110 0.111 0.090 Real Personal Income per 
capita (in thousands) (0.097) (0.098) (0.098) (0.097) (0.093) 
Republican Senate -0.543     
 (0.847)     
Divided Senate 1.885     
 (1.590)     
Republican House 0.291     
 (0.802)     
Republican Governor -0.279 -0.422 -0.409 0.027  
 (0.615) (0.599) (0.598) (0.811)  
Nearest Sunset 0.00131* 0.00118* 0.00117* 0.0013* 0.00124* 
 (0.00069) (0.00068) (0.00068) (0.0007) (0.00066) 
Population Density -0.00046 -0.00076 -0.00059 -0.0011 -0.00043 
 (0.00178) (0.00178) (0.00172) (0.0018) (0.00168) 
Hazard term -0.839 -0.915 -0.953* -0.800 -0.905 
 (0.583) (0.581) (0.575) (0.573) (0.563) 
Republican Legislature  -0.29    
  (1.014)    
Democratic Legislature  0.031    
  (0.788)    
Unified Legislature   -0.049   
   (0.760)   
Democratic Legis. and Governor  0.385  
    (0.841)  
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Table A.12 – Hazard regressions:  Considering Size of Legislature and House-Senate 
ratio  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
Constant -3.435* -2.927 
 (2.120) (2.592) 
Per capita income 0.094 0.204 
(in thousands) (0.094) (0.105) 
Size of Legislature -0.004 -0.011 
 (0.009) (0.010) 
House to Senate ratio 0.189 0.367 
 (0.407) (0.495) 
Nearest Sunset 0.00122* 0.00101 
 (0.00068) (0.00063) 
Population Density -0.00068 -0.00046 
 (0.00193) (0.00217) 
Hazard function -0.898 -1.102* 
 (0.569) (0.599) 
Other Limitations 0.095  
 (0.277)  
Tax and Expenditure limits -1.708** 
  (0.853) 
Term Limits 0.513 
  (0.725) 
Line Item Veto -2.074 
  (1.603) 
Supermajority 0.371 
  (0.814) 
Initiative and Referendum 0.806 
  (0.743) 
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Appendix B 
 
 
 
Figure B.1:  Sunset State Counts, by type 
 67
 
 
Figure B.2: Per Capita State spending – Sunset vs No Sunset 
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Figure B.3: Per Capita State Spending – By Sunset Type 
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